Abstract : One import ant claim of G.A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History is that o nl y its functional inte r pretat ion of historical materialism can solve the •fpr imacy puzzle", i.e. can reconcile the primacy of t he productive forces with tlie controllin g roJe of the p roduction relations. Cohen's recent "Reply to Four Critics" (in this journal) does not salvage this claim against my earlier critique that it is either false or trivial. He only avoids falsehood by substantially redefining t he t e rms of the puzzle. And wit h the redefined puzzle, the claim becomes trivial in the sense that one of t he two terms which the primacy puzzle consists in reconciling requires a functional interpret at ion on ~ts own . T he "Veblenian scenario" which I put forward in my earlier text and whose full fo rce Cohen has been prevented from appreciatin g by two misunderstandings, illu strates what I claim to be the general solution to the only genuine primacy puzzle.
1.
In his (expectedly) clarifying but uncompromtStng r eply to my earlie r article in t his journal (Van Pa rijs 1982), G.A. Cohen recog nizes the impor tance of d istinguishing the two senses in wh ich historical materialism explains the p roduction relations by t he productive forces. But he denies my main contention , namely that ma ki ng this distinction catches one of the central claims of his book . -t he claim that a fuilctional interpretation of historical materialism is req uired to solve t o so-called primacy puzzle -in a dilemma between falsehood and triviality (Cohen 1983, 195-2o6) . ln this b r ief r ejoinder, I shall first show that he was only abie to escape the first branch of t his dilemma by significantly modifying t he terms of the "primacy puzzle". Next, · I shall clarify the damaging sense in which his solution to the modified puzzle fails to escape the second b ra nch of the dilemma. And fi nally , I shall clear up two misunderst.andings (for which I am partly responsible) which have helped prevent him f rom appreciating the full cogency of my particular cou nterexample.
2.
"The primacy puzzle", Cohen (1983, 2od states, "is to reconcile the explanatory prio rity of the forces with the controlling roJe of the re lations". And he makes it absolutely clear that the "explanatory primacy" r efer s to the explanation of the relations by the current Iev el of the forces, and not to the explanation of the relations by ' their te·ndency to promote the de. velopment of the forces. For the primary thesis, I quote, asserts that "(2) the nature of the production relations of a society is explained by the Ievel of development of its productive forces" (ibid.) I. At first sight, therefore, there is no significant difference between Cohen's current conception of the primacy puzzle and the one I ascribe to him (in the preferred Interpretation) in my critique (Van Parijs 1983, 204-205) . There are, however, two major differences.
Firstly, compared to his earlier formulation of the primacy thesis (Cohen 1978, 134) and to my interpretation of it (Van Parijs 1982, 2oo), Cohen has now d ropped the requirement that "the nature of a set of relations [ be J explained by the Ievel of development of the productive forces embraced b y it ( to a far g reater extent than vice ver sa) "(my emp hasis), and he charges me of having paid too much attention to the latter qualifying phrase (Cohen I983, fn 8) . In the absence of such a phrase, however, it becomes altogether unclear how any primacy is asserted by the "primacy thesis", as defined above. For whether production relations are viewed as the source of productive deveiopment or oniy as profoundly affecting it ( see , section 2), it can be said that "the Ievel of development of the productive forces of a society is explained by the nature of its production relations". ln other words, the "primacy thesis" can be turned round -which amounts to saying, as primacy shouid at the very least imply antisymmetry, that there is no primacy at all in Cohen's (fully clarified) reconstruction of historical materialism 2 . In my critique of Cohen, on the other hand , I did seriously try to make sense of the "qualif ying phrase" . I interpreted it as referring to the fact that, when there is "contradiction " or " non-correspondence" between relations and forces -!! defined by "correspondence tables " such as that proposed by Cohen (1978, 198) and quoted in Van Parijs (1982, fn 10) -, the former are expected to adjust to the latter , and never the other way around (ibid. 204-205) . I still believe that this is the only sensible way in w.hich the primacy asserted by historical materialism -including reconstruction of it -can be understood. The clarification he offers in his reply implies that his current view is very different indeed.
Secondly, there is no less significant a s hift in what the primacy thesis is to be reconciled with. ln his initial definition of the primacy puzzle (recalled above), Cohen ( 1983, 2od only talks of the "controlling role of the relations", fully in tune with his earlier formulations (Cohen 1978, 278; 1980, 129-I 30; etc) . A few lines down, however , he announces that he is going to "restate" the primacy puzzle, and the latter's second term then suddenly becomes: " ( 5) The existing relations promote the development of productive power" ( Cohen 1983, 202 ). This statement is su rprising on two counts. Fir stly, it is uridisputably much more specific than the mere ascription of a "controlling role" or a "causal power" to relations -which it is supposed to restate. Secondly, as it stands, it does not make sense as part of a reconstruction of historical materialism. lndeed, a historical materiaHst is committed to the view that the existing relations sometimes fetter t he development of productive power. I therefore assume (safely I believe) that (5) should be understood, and is meant by Cohen, as a shorthand for the (definitely historical-materialist) assertion of a systematic tendency for the existing relations to promote the development of productive power. As it happens, such an assertion is identified earlier by Cohen ( 1983, 2ool as: "(ET2) There is a tendency for those relations to be selected which are best (or facilitate) the development of the forces". The Substitution of (ET2) for its shorthand expression (5) makes it even plainer that the primacy puzzle, as now u nderstood ~Y Cohen, consists in reconciling the primacy of the forces with much more than the controlling role of the relations3.
3·
Since for Cohen the primacy puzzle consists in reconciling (2) with (5), while I understood him as trying to reconcile something stronger than (2) -genuine primacy -with something weaker than (5) -control by the relations -, it is not very surprising that we should disagree about the range of possible solutions. l ndeed, I do agree that if one phrases the puzzle as Cohen now does , his unrepentantly repeated claim that "the only way to solve the primacy puzzle [ is] to represent the relations as functio nally explained by the , forces" , wr) is not demonstrably false. I say "not demonstrably false", and not "true", because it is debatable whether one can be said. to solve a puzzle -which consists in reconciling two Statements -when the proposed solution is entailed by one of the two statements on its own. And this is precisel y the case with Cohen's "solution" to his own ( relformulation of the puzzle . True, barring "remarkable coincidence" (Cohen 1983, 205) , it is impossible to hold (2) and (5) without representing the explanation of relations as a functional explanation. But this has nothing to do with (2), nor therefore with the reconciliation of (2) with (s). (5) on its own, when explicated as (ET2), commits us (leaving out flukes) to a functional interpretation. As soon as one is willing to assert the existence of a systematic tendency for those relations to be selected which are best for p r oductive development, one will also have to assert that the relations which tend to prevail do so because they are pest for productive development, i.e. one will have to endorse a functional explanation( Statement (2), which asserts that the nature of the relations is explained by the Ievel of the forces, plays no roJe whatsoever in this derivation5.
Consequently, in so far as one can talk at all of the fun ctional interpretation of historical materialism as a "solut ion" to the problern of reconciling (2) and (5), the claim that only such an explanation can solve this problern becomes plainly trivial in the sense 6 that one of the two terms whi.ch the problern consists in reconciling implies on its own that a funct ional ex -planation should be present. Avoiding such triviality obviously implies a weakening of (s) into the mere assertion of control (however massive) of the forces by the relations. The problern then reduces to conceiving of two-way causation, one of which is instantiated by the "Veblenian scenario" I offered as a counterexample in my earlier text ( V an Parijs 1982, 2o6-207) . From trivial, Cohen's claim that a functional interpretation· is required then becomes false. Of course, in so far as it implies, "together with other considerations" (Cohen 1983, 201) , the truth of (ET2), beinging in the development thesis; as Cohen (1983, 205) suggests, would salvage the validity of his claim. But no less obviously, we would then be back to triviality in the precise sense speit out above7. Shifting the puzzle by reinterpreting its terms or by beinging in · new elements will not do. There is no way out of Cohen's dilerrma.
4·
This is not to say, however, that the primacy puzzle cannot be given an interesting interpretation, . nor that, on such an interpretation, the functional interpretation of historical materialism does not constitute a particularly interesting solution to it. But the primacy puzzle must then be construed, as I did in my earlier article, a s a challenge to reconcile a genuine primacy of the forces over the relations (in the precise sense recalled in § 2 above) with the causal power of the relations over the forces. The solution of this puzzle does not require a functional interpretation. To show this, I made up, freely follow ing Veblen, the following counterexample. Suppose the Ievel of development of the productive forces, due to the type of technology it is associated with , determines (allowing for adjustment lags) the nature of the relations of production, by moulding mental habits in specific ways. The forms of relations which prevail as a result do have a significant influence on further prod uctive development, though .not always a favourable one. Some forms foster the maintenance of the currently used technology, others favour progressive technological c hanges, others still rather encourage regression to a type of technology cor responding to a lower Ievel of productive development. Anyway, . whether a particular form of production relations is favourable or unfavourable to the development of the productive forces is irrelevant to its rise and to its persistence at the current Ievel of development of the productive forces (though of course not to how fast one will move to another such Ievel , at which the current form of relations will soon be displaced). For what determines the rise and persistence of production relations is the mou lding of mental habits, not the selection of those relations whic h are best for productive developrnent.
In t his scenario, t he two terms of the (genuine) primac y puzzle are present. Fi rstly, there is a primacy of the forces over the relations in the following sense: it is possible to draw a table of correspondence between Ievels of forces (or types of technology ) and forms of relations, and whenever there is a contradiction, or a Iack of correspondence, between forces and relations, it is predicted that the latter wÜI adjust to the former (via the moulding of mental habits). Secondly·, there is also a "controlling role" . of the relations , in the sense tllat they deeply affect what happens to the forces. Nontheless, no functional explanation is involved. Note, however, that a functional explanation would ncessarily be involved if either of the two terms which I have just said were present in the scenario were meant in a stronger sense -as Cohen thinks is the case. Firstly, if by "contradiction" were meant a state of affairs in which the relations fetter the forces, then, as Cohen ( 1983, 204) cor rectly points o~t, the claim that wh.enever there is contradiction the relations adjust does indeed commit us ( barring appeal to · "accident") to a functional interpretation. Nowhere in my article, however, have I given to thi te rm "contradiction" more than .the much weaker meaning recalled above . Secondly , if by the "controlling power " of the relations were meant the systematic prorr.otion of the forces by the relations, we would of course once again (barring "accident") be coovnitted to a functional interpretation. What I assumed in the scenario, however, is not t hat "the prevailing relations further the development of the forces" (Cohen 1983, 205) , but only that .they may do so · (Van Parijs 1982 , 207) . Once these two points are clarified, it is obvious that no functional explanation is required to make sense of the scenario, nor therefore to solve t~e (genuine) primacy puzzle. Of course, the sce-. nario does not satisfy the development thesis. But as pointed out above ( § 3), beinging the latter in, which implies on its own the need for a functional explanation, would amount to trivializing a potentially interesting claim.
The alternative claim put forward in my article is that the necessary and sufficient condition for the primacy of one variable to be reconciled with the controlling role of a variable subordinated to it is the coexistence of a "fast" and a "slow" dynamics. I realize that the few paragraphs I devoted to presenting it ( whether in V an Parijs 1982 or, somewhat more extensively, in Van Parijs 1979) did not succeed in making it readily intelligible. Perhaps the following remarks will help. Suppose that, in the "Veblenian scenario", a particular form of relations (brought about as a result of the moulding of mental habits by a particular type of technology) quickly Ieads to a new type of technology and then again to another type, before the former has had time to mould mental habits (as it would had it been given sufficient time). lf this is the case, it is no Ionger possible to establish the kind of correspondence tables which is essential , as ·recalled above, to . define the primacy of the forces. Talking in terms of correspondence, contradiction and adjustment of the relations to the forces no Ionger makes sen.se. And what has happened is simp ly a speeding_ up of the "slow dynamics" (i.e. the causal influence of for ms of relations on type of technology), in such a way that the earlier distinction between a "fast dynamics" (which determines equilibrium "correspondence laws") and a "slow dynami~s" (which captures the feedback) can no Ionger be made.
Analogously, take the relation between a species and its environment, Cohen's iast resort · in his attempt to clarify his notion of primacy9. In general, the interaction between species and environment can indeed be captured as. the conjunction of a fast dynamics (which accounts for tlie possibility of "correspondence laws" between features of the environment and · featu res of Ii vi ng popu lation s, with the latter adju stin g to the former) and a slow dynamics (the more or less negligible feedback from the populations to the environment). Would there still be an explanatory primacy of the· ( changing aspects of the) environment over the species, however, if the species (e.g. contemporary man) started affecting the environment at such a pace that each state of the latter is given no time to exert its se'lection pressu res on the genetic characteristics of the former? I think not, as correspondence laws between aspects of the erivironment and adaptive genetic features would no Ionger make sense. And the reason why pr.imacy has vanished is again that the distinction between a fast and slow dynamics can no Ionger be made.
These two examples, I hope, go some way towards making more intuitive what I say when I talk of the coexistence of a slow and a fast dynamics, . or when I say that such a coexistence is both necessary and sufficient to reconcile the forces' primacy with the relations' controlling roJe. Cohen's functional interpretation of historical materialism, which does effect this reconiliation, is just another instance of the same sort of coexistence. But it is a very peculiar instance of it: one which embeds the slow dynamics into the fast one, in the sense· that the process by which the Ievel of the forces determines the form of the relations involves the (differential) influence of' the latter on the former. Viewing Cohen's interpretation as one particular element in a wider dass of possible solutions to the (genuine) primacy puzzle does not undermirie its validity nor its interest. Quite the contrary. But it plainly refutes Cohen's claim that his solution is the only possible one. Cohen (1983, 202) claims that this is what he has always meant by the "primacy thesis" and that he has never used that Iabel to designate "(4) The existing relations prevail because of their propensity to promote productive power", which corresponds to my alternative interpretation of it. ln his reply, he argues at some length that the passage I quote (Van Parijs 1982, 200) should be understood, not as a clarification of the meaning of the expression, but as a partial clarification of th nature of the primacy of the forces in historical materialism (Cohen 1983, 203 I982 , fn 5) -should have picked precisely the wrong one? Moreover, in the reply itself but when discussing another topic (and hence, presumably, off his guard), Cohen indicates twice that he has interpretation (4) in mind. How else could one make sense of the statement· that "the primacy thesis implies that when relations are the source of the development of the forces they obtain precisely because they ensure that development" (Cohen 1983, 199) ? And a few pages down (ibid. 201), he refers to his book's derivation of "(ET2) There is a tendency for those relations to be selected which are best for the development of the forces" frorr. the development thesis together with sorr.e considerations. lf one Iooks up the page he mentions (Cohen 1978, 158) , it turns out that what is there derived from the development thesis and other considerations is the primacy thesis as defined b y ( 5)! · The all-important distinction between explanation by Ievel of the forces and explanation .by promotion of the forces is once again being blurred.
Notes
Cohen's most elaborate attempt to specify the meaning of "primacy", to which he refers in a footnote (Cohen 1983, fn 8) , is very unsatisfactory indeed, precisely because it does not go much beyond "a merely intuitive basi's" and does not say explicitly what it isthat makes for primacy. Pushing Cohen's attempt further, I maintain, can only yield the explication I propose (see § 4 below).
The clarity of Cohen's current stance would have been enhanced, had he emphasized this shift from his earlier foqnulations. Here is a missed opportunity to do so: "But the 'underlying problem' is not to reconcile primacy with two-way causation, but with the particular 'massive control' exercised by the relations" (Cohen 1983, 203, my emphasis) , with the latter expression presumably to be u nder stood in terms of ( 5).
For a fuller argument, see V an Parijs ( 1981, 75 -77) , where the nature . of the relations between universal optimalism (the assertion of a systematic tendency for features with optimal consequences to prevail) and the validation of functional explanations (i.e. explanations of those features by these consequences) is speit out in the particular context of evolutionary biology.
Compare Cohen ( 19~3, 205) : "lt is not u ninteresting that the p rimacy of the productive forces requires functional explanation even if it is demonstrable when all the elements of the theory are in place". Cohen's problern sterils from the fact that when A and B jointly require C simply because B requires C, it can hardly be true, Iet alone interesting, to say that A requires C.
Which, as Cohen (1983, 205 ) · rightly points out, I did not make explicit when using the term (in Van Parijs 1982, 207-208 and. fn rr).
Note, incidentally, that the derivation of ET2 from ETx is by no means as obvious as Cohen (1983, 2ox) seems to imply by using "since" in ET3. (The page of KMTH which he refers to deals with the derivation of (5), and not ET2, from ET1, and is therefore of little help). To use his u seful analogy: it is b y no mean s obviou s that the existence of an autonomcus tendency to grow up implies the existence of a tendency to select those kinds of food which will maximize a child's rate of growth. ·
